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GEOGRAPHIC COMPETITION
AND COLLUSION IN DUOPOLY
Charles H. Steen * and Kevin S. Marshall"
I. INTRODUCTION
The division of geographic markets into exclusive territories by
horizontally competitive firms is a per se violation of the Sherman Act, and
under some circumstances, even invites criminal sanctions., Conventional
* Dr. Charles H. Steen received his Bachelor of Science in Economics, with distinction,
from George Mason University in 1986; and then his Master of Arts in Economics in 1988,
Juris Doctor in 1991, and Doctor of Philosophy in Economics in 1993, all from the
University of Virginia. Dr. Steen serves as an adjunct professor in economics at Southern
Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
** Kevin S. Marshall is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of La Verne's
College of Law, Ontario, California. Dr. Marshall received his B.A. in economics from
Knox College, Galesburg, Illinois in 1982, a Juris Doctorate from Emory University's
School of Law in 1985, a Masters in Public Affairs from the University of Texas at Dallas in
1991, and a Ph.D. in political economy from the University of Texas in 1993. Professor
Marshall teaches remedies, law and economics, and antitrust law.
1. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW, §
20.07a at 1014 (2002) (citing Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam)).
See also United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming conviction after
rivals divided markets for billboard sites and agreed not to compete for one another's sites);
United States v. Suntar Roofing, 897 F.2d 469, 481 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming conviction
upon unlawful per se horizontal customer allocation among roofers); United States v. Coop.
Theatres, 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding motion picture "split" illegal per se);
Affiliated Capital Corp. v. City of Houston, 700 F.2d. 226, 236 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding
agreement among municipal cable television companies dividing the city into geographic
regions unlawful per se), rev'd en banc, 735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Capitol Serv., 756 F.2d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 1985), (civil challenge to motion picture split
agreement; unlawful per se); Service Merch. Co. v. Boyd Corp., 722 F.2d 945, 950 (1st Cir.
1983) (holding agreement among distributors of microwave ovens dividing their territories
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antitrust policy also precludes mergers that might allow firms to
monopolize geographic markets. While the underlying rationale driving
per se liability may be appropriate in cases involving most "naked
restraints of trade,",2 such a conclusive presumption may be inappropriate in
oligopoly and duopoly markets, given the realities of their interdependent
natures. Under reasonable assumptions, one can demonstrate that market
division agreements may actually enhance societal surplus in a market
driven by producer interdependence.3 Under such limited and constrained
assumptions, collusion (whether tacit or explicit) to divide geographic
markets may result in a welfare increasing Nash equilibrium.
II. THE PER SE RULE AGAINST TERRITORIAL COLLUSION
The Supreme Court applies per se prohibitions to "agreements or
practices which, because of their pernicious effect on competition and their
lack of any redeeming virtue, are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal, without elaborate inquiry as to the
per se unlawful); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1981) (dicta);
Engine Specialties v. Bombardier Ltd., 605 F.2d 1, 7-11 (Ist Cir. 1979) (holding market
division agreement between manufacturer of minicycles and potential entrant per se
unlawful); Gainsville Utils. Dept. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 300 (5th Cir.
1978) (holding geographic market division between two utilities covering wholesale power
unlawful per se); United States v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 574 (2d Cir.
1961) (holding horizontal customer allocation scheme among linen supply companies per se
unlawful); Agencies v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, No. 88-C20265, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3446, at *72 (N.D. I11. Feb. 26, 1993) (holding territorial division agreement among
otherwise competing health insurers unlawful per se); Bascom Food Prods. Corp. v. Reese
Finer Foods, 715 F.Supp. 616, 630-632 (D.N.J. 1989) (holding market arrangement
unlawful notwithstanding some doubt about whether the arrangement was really horizontal).
2. In addressing the rationale for a per se rule of liability with respect to a "naked restraint
of trade," the Supreme Court has made it clear that a commercial practice will be
condemned where it 1) usually results in significant adverse competitive effects; 2) is rarely
justified by significant redeeming virtues; and 3) when there are often less restrictive
alternatives available. See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION 228 (5th ed. 2003).
See also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985); FTC. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 284 (1985); Cont'l TV,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
3. See AREEDA & HOVENKANM, supra note 1, § 14.07 at 471 (defining "one firm's actions
[as] interdependent with those of another when their utility depends on the other firm's
response. If firm A has any influence on market price, it knows that its price change will
affect rivals and that its gain from changing price depends upon rival reactions." Similarly,
if firm A directs its competitive efforts into a territory, it knows that such effort will affect
rivals and that its gain from such efforts will depend upon its rival's reactions).
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precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."4 The
classical applications of per se prohibitions have been to cases involving
price fixing cartels.5
In United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
the division of geographic markets into exclusive territories by horizontal
competitors, like price fixing, constituted a per se violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.6 In Topco, the Supreme Court went so far as to state that
the law was then long-settled because the activity constituted a horizontal
restraint with no purpose other than to reduce competition; the justices
therefore deemed territorial collusion per se illegal.7 Notwithstanding the
Topco Court's emphatic statement on this point, the cases relied upon by
the Court to support its ruling do not establish a per se rule against
horizontal territorial collusion.8 Since Topco, meanwhile, the wisdom of
4. Cont'l T.V., 433 U.S. at 50 (applying the standard from N. Pac. R. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), to abolish the per se prohibition against vertically motivated
territorial restraints).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (rejecting the
appellate court's rule of reason analysis, and holding that price fixing agreements among
horizontal competitors are unlawful per se).
6. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 591, 608-12 (1972) (Marshall, J.)
(stating without citation, "One of the classic examples of a per se violation of §1 is an
agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure to allocate
territories in order to minimize competition" and holding that an agreement by horizontal
competitors to divide geographic markets into exclusive territories is a per se violation of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1).
7. In Topco, Justice Marshall reasoned: (1) horizontal agreements are unlawful per se; (2)
the division of geographic markets presented in Topco was a horizontal agreement; and (3)
therefore, the agreement was unlawful per se. Topco, 405 U.S. at 608-12. Justice Marshall
cited numerous cases wherein various varieties of horizontal restraints were held to be
unlawful per se; however, none of those cases actually made geographic collusion alone-
absent an agreement to fix prices, for example-unlawful per se. Id.
8. Justice Marshall wrote, "This Court has reiterated time and time again that
'[h]orizontal territorial limitations ... are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
stifling of competition."' Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)). However, White involved exclusive territories in
distribution contracts (vertical restraints). White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 267 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("But ... territorial restraints were imposed [vertically]."). To the extent White
can be read as involving a horizontal agreement, its per se rule was derived from Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). But, although Timken clearly
involved geographic allocations, the Court was equally clear that its objections, and
application of the per se rule, ran to an aggregation of trade restraints, including price fixing.
Timken, 341 U.S. at 597-98. Thus, Timken does not establish that simple territorial
collusion, absent price fixing, suffered per se illegality before Topco, despite Justice
Marshall's apparent certainty to the contrary.
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applying per se illegality to horizontal restraints has been undermined
generally, both in legal commentary and case law. 9 Nevertheless, the per
se rule against geographic collusion continues in full force and effect.10
The model proffered below demonstrates the danger in applying a per
se rule of liability in all market division cases. It also illustrates the merits
of a rule of reason analysis applied to geographic sub-competitive
environments of oligopoly and duopoly where welfare enhancement may
be a remedial concern.
III. FEDERAL MERGER POLICY'S CONCERN WITH GEOGRAPHIC
CONCENTRATION
Federal horizontal merger policy is primarily concerned with
geographic concentration." Under the standard analysis of a horizontal
merger, whether challenged by federal authorities or private litigants, the
essential foci include: (1) geographic market delineation, typically
determined according to the well-known Elzinga-Hogarty test; 12 and (2)
9. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 226 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (Bork, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.) ("to the extent that Topco and Sealy stand for the
proposition that all horizontal restraints are illegal per se, they must be regarded as
effectively overruled."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). In his carefully reasoned
opinion, Judge Bork surveyed the emergence and evolution of per se illegality under the
Sherman Act, and reasoned that based upon the Supreme Court's reformation of the law of
horizontal restraints in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1
(1979), and National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85
(1984), and other post-Topco cases, the general applicability of per se illegality to horizontal
restraints was neither a wise nor workable approach to antitrust law and policy. See also
Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy
and Topco Logically Survive Sylvania and Broadcast Music?, 66 VA. L. REv. 879 (1980).
10. Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (quoting Justice Marshall in
Topco, 405 U.S. at 608-12, the Supreme Court held, without analysis, that agreements to
divide geographic territories are per se illegal under the Sherman Act). See Bus. Elecs.
Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 734 (1988) (clarifying the meaning and scope of
horizontal versus vertical agreements, the Court, citing Topco, reaffirmed that "a horizontal
agreement to divide territories is per se illegal").
11. Merger challenges typically proceed under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C §
18 (making unlawful any merger the effect of which may be substantially to lessen
competition), and/or Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (making unlawful
contracts and combinations in restraint of trade). Recent cases generally have concluded
that mergers challenged under either statute should receive the same substantive treatment
See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.).
12. Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market
Delineation in Antitrust Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973). See, e.g., United States v.
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pre- and post-merger concentration levels within the geographic market,
typically measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).1 3 The stock
argument against horizontal mergers is that as concentration within a
geographic market increases, it becomes easier for firms to collude and
thereby harm consumers in violation of the antitrust laws.14 The premise of
this argument is fairly uncontroversial: by merging, firms can normally
coordinate their activities at lower costs. 15  The argument's conclusion,
however, requires a logical leap. Specifically, it is not obvious that
dividing geographic markets into exclusive territories harms consumers.
Thus, like the per se rule against agreements to divide geographic markets
into territories, federal merger policy rests in large part on intuition that is
not necessarily supported by a well-specified theory of geographic
competition.
IV. THE INTERDEPENDENT NATURE OF OLIGOPOLY AND DUOPOLY
It has long been proffered that "antitrust policy, as expressed in our
present statutes, cannot properly be guided by any other goal than
Rockford Mem'l Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (wherein the court conducted its
own Elzinga-Hogarty tests to delineate a geographic market for application in an action
pursuant to Section 7 of the Clayton Act), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.).
13. See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, April 2 §§ 1.4 - 1.5, (rev. ed. 1997) [hereinafter Merger Guidelines] available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2005). See, e.g., Christian
Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heilman Brewing Co., 600 F. Supp. 1326, 1329 (E.D. Mich.
1985) (analyzing concentration according to an HHI analysis and granting a preliminary
injunction against a merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1354 (6th
Cir. 1985).
14. The Merger Guidelines provide, in pertinent part:
Other things being equal, market concentration affect the likelihood that one firm,
or a small group of firms, could successfully exercise market power. . . .If
collective action is necessary for the exercise of market power, as the number of
firms necessary to control a given percentage of total supply decreases, the
difficulties and costs of reaching and enforcing an understanding with respect to
the control of that supply might be reduced.
Merger Guidelines, supra note 13, § 2.0. See also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 973-74 (1981) ("But a
horizontal merger is more likely to facilitate collusion by reducing the number of firms that
must agree for collusion to be effective, and thus the transaction costs of agreement, than it
is to create a dominant firm .... ).
15. Id. See generally Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972).
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consumer welfare."' 6 Conventional economic theory provides that perfectly
competitive markets are "socially optimal" (under the right conditions) in
that "the aggregate economic welfare of consumers and producers is
maximized."' 7 Thus, antitrust analysis has necessarily turned to applied
economic theory in assessing anticompetitive conduct, competitive injury
and remedial alternatives. As a practical matter, the perfectly competitive
model provides insight as to the type of conduct that may constitute a
"restraint of trade" (i.e., conduct that jeopardizes or threatens any of the
model's underlying assumptions). The model also provides insight as to
whether such conduct results in competitive injury (i.e., sub-optimal
efficiencies as defined in terms of consumer and producer welfare).
A. COMPETITION V. OLIGOPOLY-STRUCTURAL DISTINCTIONS
An implicit condition of the perfectly competitive market is its
endogenous independent character. Perfect competition requires numerous
buyers and sellers such that no one buyer or seller can affect a product's
price. Generally, each buyer and seller consumes and/or produces such a
negligible amount in relation to the market's total output that his or her
respective market behavior will have no affect on the price of any
product. 18 An alternative way of stating the price-taking assumption is that
16. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 9 (1978).
17. EDWIN MANSFIELD & GARY YORE, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
324 (11 th ed. 2004). See also STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
230 (6th ed. 2005) ("In a competitive equilibrium, the sum of all the gains to all the market
participants is as large as possible."); ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD,
MICROECONOMICS 574 (5th ed. 2001) ("[T]he allocation in a competitive equilibrium is
economically efficient.").
18. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 290 ("[P]erfect competition requires that each
participant in the market, whether buyer or seller, be so small in relation to the entire market
that he or she cannot affect the product's price.") See also PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 17, at 252 ("Because each individual finn sells a sufficiently small proportion of total
market output, its decisions have no impact on market price."); LANDSBURG, supra note 17,
at 180 ("Ordinarily, firms are competitive when they serve a small part of the market. As
long as you are small, you can greatly increase your output and still find customers at the
going price. By contrast, firms with large market shares typically must lower their prices to
attract more customers."); STEPHEN A. MATHIS AND JANET KOSCIANSKI, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 325 (2002) ("Since there are so many sellers and
buyers, with each respectively producing and consuming an imperceptively small amount of
the marketwide output of a homogeneous good, no one seller or buyer has the ability to
exert any direct control over the price of the product."); MICHAEL E. WETZSTEIN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY, CONCEPTS AND CONNECTIONS 258 (2005) ("Every firm in the
market is so small, relative to the market as a whole, it cannot exert a perceptible influence
on price. Each firm is a price taker.").
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"there are many independent firms and independent consumers in the
market all of whom believe-correctly-that their decisions will not affect
prices."' 19 Obviously, coordinated behavior among market participants
jeopardizes this condition. For example, "producers acting together to
change output will certainly affect price, but any producer acting alone
cannot do So." ' 20 Accordingly, economic theory suggests that commercial
activities coordinated through an explicit market division agreement
directly threatens the independent nature of perfect competition. To the
extent these coordinated activities result in the reduction of output with a
simultaneous affect on price, such activities are counterintuitive with
respect to the welfare maximization principles of the perfectly competitive
model.
One should bear in mind that perfect competition is a model, and as
such it "abstracts from reality and can be used as a basis for evaluating
more realistic structures., 21 Few, if any, markets conform to the perfectly
competitive market model for achieving welfare maximization. For
example, the interdependent nature of oligopoly and duopoly market
structures (as opposed to perfect competition's independent nature)
threatens the perfectly competitive model's price-taking assumption
mentioned above.
An oligopolistic market is composed of a relatively small number of
interdependent firms.22 If there are only two firms in the market, it is called
a duopoly.23 Since oligopoly contains a small number of rivals, any change
in a firm's price or output has a direct influence on the sales and profits of
its competitors.24 Consequently, "each oligopolist formulates its policies
strategies with an eye to their effects on its rivals. ' 25 In fact, economic
19. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 17, at 252 ("Another way of stating the price-
taking assumption is there are many independent firms and independent consumers in the
market all of whom believe-correctly-that their decisions will not affect prices")
(emphasis added).
20. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 290.
21. WETZSTEIN, supra note 18, at 259.
22. Id. See also MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 426 ("[T]he supply side of an
oligopoly market is composed of very few firms."); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 17,
at 429 ("In oligopolistic markets ...only a few firms account for most or all of total
production."); LANDSBURG, supra note 17, at 401 ("An oligopoly is an industry in which the
number of firms is sufficiently small that any one firm's actions can affect market
conditions.").
23. WETZSTEIN, supra note 18, at 482.
24. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 426.
25. Id. See also WETZSTEIN, supra note 18, at 482 ("oligopoly markets are characterized
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theory instructs that "for almost any major economic decision a firm
makes-setting price, determining production levels, undertaking a major
promotion campaign, or investing in new production capacity-it must try
to determine the most likely response of its competitors.,
26
B. EQUILIBRIUM IN OLIGOPOLY
In competition, a market is in equilibrium when all firms are doing the
best they can (i.e., each maximizing their profits) and have no reason to
change their price or output. 27 In perfect competition, firms are indifferent
with respect to their rival's behavior because each firm is assumed to be a
price-taker; that is, they "regard their demand curve fixed in the short-run
and determined by impersonal and anonymous market forces. 2 8  In
oligopoly, however, "each firm is forced to formulate its own price and
output decisions on the basis of its assumptions about what its rivals will
do, and it knows who those rivals are."29 Consequently, the concept of
equilibrium as it applies to oligopoly markets is modified somewhat to take
into consideration oligopoly's structural characteristics.
In oligopoly, "each firm will want to do the best it can given what its
competitors are doing. '30 And each firm will assume that its "competitors
will do the best they can do given what that firm is doing." 31 In short,
"[e]ach firm, then, takes its competitors into account, and assumes that its
competitors are doing likewise., 32 This situation is commonly referred to
as a Nash equilibrium.
33
by mutual dependence. It is necessary for each firm to consider the reactions of its
competitors."); MATHIS AND KOSCIANSKI, supra note 18, at 445 ("the competition among
firms comprising an oligopoly is quite personal, since each firm's profit is affected by the
price and output behavior of other firms in the market."); PINDYCK AND RUBINFELD, supra
note 17, at 429 ("In [competitive] markets, each firm could take price or market demand as
given and largely ignore its competitors. In an oligopolistic market, however, a firm sets
price and output based partly on strategic considerations regarding the behavior of its
competitors.").
26. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 17, at 429.
27. Id. at 430.
28. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 428.
29. Id. at 426.
30. PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 17, at 430.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. MANSFIELD & YOHE, supra note 17, at 428. See also PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra
note 17, at 430.
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C. A HYPOTHETICAL NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN DUOPOLY
Conceivably, one can imagine an oligopoly situation consisting of two
firms in a Nash equilibrium whereby each firm has refrained from entering
the geographic markets of the other. Each firm is doing the best it can,
given what its competitor is doing, and vice versa. Each firm is likely to
assume that should it enter the geographic market of the other, such entry
will be met with resistance resulting in a competitive engagement that
could be ruinous for either. Although the entry payoff may be great for
either firm, the losses may be devastating and perhaps even terminal for the
losing firm. Consequently, a Nash equilibrium may be reached with both
firms producing in adjacent geographic markets which abut one another,
with each refraining from entry into the other's geographic market. In such
a scenario, a Nash equilibrium is reached not by collusive conduct, but by
each firm's strategic decision seeking to maximize its respective utility
given the interdependent nature of the oligopoly market.
Under the current state of the law, any collusive decision to allocate
territories (whether tacit or explicit) between the two firms will likely
constitute a per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
However, as explained below, such a collusive agreement may nonetheless
have welfare enhancing effects as well as result in a Nash equilibrium.
And it is from this perspective that one should question the propriety of a
per se approach to antitrust liability with respect to explicit market division
agreements.
V. A WELFARE ENHANCING MODEL OF COLLUSION IN DUOPOLY
Assume there are two identical firms located on a geometric plane,
each producing identical goods which they sell to homogeneous and
uniformly distributed consumers. Further assume that initially these firms
are sufficiently distant from one another such that they do not compete for
customers; each is a monopolist over its own geographic market circle.
Imagine next, that each firm expands its sales in the direction of the other,
resulting in their individual markets moving closer and closer together. As
the distance between these firms decreases, their potential market circles-
that is, consumers to whom these firms could sell at a profit-begin to
overlap, thus delineating a set of consumers who can potentially turn to
either firm for their purchases.
Winter 2006]
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that, in general, finns in such
geographic proximity that do not collude will produce more output and sell it
at a lower price than they would if they colluded. This intuition forms the
foundation for both the per se rule against territorial collusion, and federal
merger policy against the monopolization of geographic markets. However,
the underlying rationale driving this convention may be flawed in strategic,
interdependent markets of oligopoly and duopoly. As careful analysis reveals,
these policies probably are not justified on efficiency grounds.
VI. THE BASIC FRAMEWORK FOR DUOPOLY MODELING IN THREE
DIMENSIONS
The specific problem considered is geographic competition among
firms located on a plane populated by uniformly distributed consumers.
Firms' potential marketing areas are confined by the interplay of consumer
reservation prices and transportation costs (technology). Examples of the
kinds of products to which the models presented here might apply are
truck-delivered concrete and home-delivered pizza. These products tend to
be both produced and consumed in geographically confined markets. The
models presented here are likely inapplicable to products like software or
wholesale computer chips because such products are readily shipped over
long distances. For ease of exposition, the models are restricted to simple
monopoly and duopoly.
A. GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS VERSUS GEOGRAPHIC COMPETITION
For expositional clarity, it is important to first define key terms, at least
to the level of working definitions. Consistent with antitrust jurisprudence,
a geographic market is defined as an identifiable set of sellers to whom an
identifiable set of consumers may, as a practical matter, turn for their
supplies. 34 Geographic competition concerns firms within a geographic
market that compete for turf. It refers to the decisions of producers and
consumers within a geographic market, and the economic consequences of
34. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J.) (applying the rule from Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320,
328 (1961) and United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 358-61 (1963)).
Indeed, for antitrust purposes, this definition delineates a market generally, and not merely a
geographic market. However, because the models presented here assume a homogeneous
product market, this definition delineates a geographic market. See generally Landes &
Posner, supra note 14, at 964. The definition of geographic market used in the Merger
Guidelines § 1.2 et seq. is to the same in effect.
[Vol. 2:1
COLLUSION IN DUOPOLY
their decisions. The models presented here explore geographic competition
by divining strategies firms may use to capture their optimal geographic
sales areas, in light of their rivals' expected best responses.
B. A SIMPLE MODEL OF GEOGRAPHIC MONOPOLY
The geographic monopolist's problem is depicted in Figure 1. In its
simplest formulation, a geographic monopolist is a firm that, due to its
remoteness from other producers, has within its area of potentially
profitable sales only consumers who cannot turn to another producer for
their supplies at or below their reservation price. To fix the notation to be
used and the basic contours of the models, consider first a single-price,
quantity-choice monopolist located on a market plane of homogeneous and
uniformly distributed consumers, each of whom has a linear inverse
demand function for the firm's wares. Assume this firm produces a single
homogeneous product, with no fixed costs and constant marginal costs.
Without loss of generality, marginal costs are set to zero. Assume
transportation costs are positive, constant, equal to one per unit of distance
and borne by consumers. Assume each consumer has a delivered
reservation price of one and is willing to purchase one unit of output per
period. Thus, the firm faces an inverse demand function of the form
z = I -p where p E [0,1] is the radius of the firm's circle of actual sales.
Because the firm's quantity choice also determines its circle of actual sales,
profit maximization may be represented conveniently as a choice among
feasible cylinders within a cone having a height and radius of one. Thus,
the monopolist's problem is to choose p to maximize 'p2 (1 - p), which
has as its solution p = 2/3.
Figure 1
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VII. Competition in a Geographic Duopoly
A. SPECIFICATION OF A GEOGRAPHIC MARKET
Keeping the technology and other market parameters assumed above,
consider next a duopoly comprised of Firms i and j. Assume Firm i is
located at the origin of the xy market plane, and that Firmj is located at (',
0). If 1 > 4/3, Firms i andj cannot be said to compete geographically in
any economically meaningful way. Rather for, 3 > 4/3, each firm would
simply choose a market radius of 2/3, and thereby produce and profit as
independent stand-alone monopolists. Accordingly, 3 < 4/3 is assumed.
To complete the notation, let p and r denote respectively Firms i and j's
decision variables.
As depicted in Figure 2, when 5 < 4/3 and p + r _> 4/3, the sales
areas of Firms i andj overlap and delineate a lens-shaped set of consumers
who may-within the bounds of their reservation price-choose between
Firms i andj for their supplies. That is, Firms i andj comprise the set of
producers to whom a set of consumers may, as a practical matter, turn for
their supplies. Thus, we have specified a geographic market.





B. THE EQUI-PRICE FRONTIER
Consistent with the usual tenets of consumer choice, consumers within
the lens depicted in Figure 2 will purchase from the firm having the lower
delivered price. This implies the existence of a demarcation curve within
the lens such that to the left of the curve, consumers within the lens will
purchase from Firm i (because its delivered price is less than Firm i's),
while to the right of the curve consumers within the lens will purchase from
Firm j (because its delivered price is less than Firm j's). Consumers
located precisely along the curve will be indifferent between Firms i andj
because their delivered prices will be equal. Accordingly, this curve is
called the equi-price frontier. 35 The formal derivation of the equi-price
frontier can be found in the Appendix.
Figure 3 shows a representative configuration of the equi-price frontier
for p < r. Note that the equi-price frontier describes how consumers
within a lens created by circles of radii p and r will allocate their purchases
between Firms i andj. Stated differently, the equi-price frontier identifies
those consumers whose purchases a firm can capture from (lose to) its rival
by unilaterally increasing (decreasing) its output and clearing it from the
market at a lower (higher) price.
35. For example, consumers will purchase from the firm with the lowest delivered price.
Given the geographic location of both the firm and the consumer, consumers located to the
left of the equi-price frontier will purchase from Firm i because the cost of delivery is less
than the cost of delivery associated with a purchase from Firm j. Likewise, consumers
located to the right of the equi-price frontier will purchase Firm j because the cost of
delivery is less than the cost of delivery associated with a purchase from Firm i. Along the
equi-price frontier, consumers are indifferent because the cost of delivery is equal with
respect to either firm.
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C. MARKET FORCES IN GEOGRAPHIC COMPETITION
Stated formally, the equi-price frontier is the set of all (x,y) C 912
such that
.2 + 2(p-r)x 2 +y 2 -(p -r) 2
23
Note if p = r, then x = 5/2, implying that under symmetry the equi-
price frontier is a vertical line midway between the two firms. Figure 3
shows a representative configuration of the equi-price frontier for p < r.
Specifying the equi-price frontier helps identify two competing forces
that bear on a firm's production choice, given its rival's responsive
strategy. These are (1) sales to be gained (lost) by increasing (decreasing)
output, including implications of the equi-price frontier; and (2) market
spoilage from increasing (decreasing) output, which, according to the
inverse demand function, necessarily decreases (increases) price. Thus, as
in ordinary quantity-choice models, choosing one's output in geographic
competition requires trading off marginally profitable sales against
spoilage, in light of the expected response of one's rivals. However,
geographic competition differs from ordinary quantity-choice models in
important ways. For example, as we show below, because a firm's quantity
choice is actually an area, and not just an amount, spoilage enters the profit
maximization calculus raised to the second power as compared to ordinary
quantity-choice models. In other words, firms in geographic competition
do not merely face spoilage-they face spoilage squared. It is because of
this squaring that standard economic intuition should not be trusted.
Letting c = X+ y2 denote the distance from the origin to each
point on the equi-price frontier, and substituting p cos t for x, the
expression for the equi-price frontier can be expressed in polar form as
23 p cos t -. 52 + (p - r)'
c(t) 2(p- r)
Assume Firms i and j do not attempt to prevent their sales from
crossing the equi-price frontier. Instead, Firms i andj simply choose p and
r, respectively, to maximize their own profits, each in light of the other's
best response. That is, they choose the amounts they will produce, and
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then let their output clear the market. In this case, Firm i's profit is given
by
(1p) !P2(, ~) + 02,5 p COS t-_6 2 +(P)ldt]
f2-(p -d r)
where 0 is the angle subtended from the x axis to the intersections of the
circles having radii of p and r by the equi-price frontier. Note that the
profit function is the product of price (1 - p), times the sum of two areas,
implying a strong penalty, relative to ordinary quantity-choice models,
from spoilage due to unilaterally increasing output. Note also that as 0 isdp p sin
determined, p is determined. Specifically, p = p(O) and - =dO cos 0
Thus, Firm i can choose 0 to maximize its profit. The first order
conditions for profit maximization are
0 = P6((24,ir _ 189) j-r4 + 2r2(pV +,522) - p4 + 25 2P2 _.5 + 2582)
+pj(46rO+120+ t(-72r-16))V-r4 + 2r2(p2 +82)-p4 + 282p2 -4
,+82(-79r- 10)
+p 4((28r- 32r9+ 72r2 +48r)) j-r4 +2r2(P2 +82)-p4 + 282P 2 -8j
.82r(94r + 32) - 66
3((-12r30+24r2 2+ +-24r' - 48r2)) /-r4 + 2r2(p2 + 82) - p 4 + 282P 2 -
+82r2 (-50r - 44) + 5'(50r- 12)
+P 2 (82(8rO- 12r 20)+ 14r
4 0- 28y40+ 167i) -r4 + 2r2(p2 + 2) _p
4 
+ 28 2p 2 _ 4
+82r3(9r + 32) + 64d-22r - 24) _-g
+( 4(840- 2rO) - 2rO- 4r40+ 4J2r30) j-r4 + 2r2(P2 + 82) - p
4 + 28 2p 2 _
+ "2r4( r- 10) + r 2 (2r + 12) + 9(4- 5r)
+266r
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For r = p, the real-valued extrema are given by
0= 40 3p(-2p 3 + 2p 2 - S 2p + 62) 4p2 - 2 + 1234p(1 - p)(38" - 2p2)
which has the roots
p=0, p=l, 2 2 (82 0 4P
2  
_32 + 33]
404p2 - 2 -12.5
By applying several trigonometric identities these can be rewritten as
Ep=o p=l' 0= 3 cos 9 sin 01
p~l 9-2 COS 2 9+11
The third root shown has only one real solution, 0 = 0. Thus, the
equilibrium extrema are
[p=0, p=l, 0=0]
Note that when 0 = 0, then p = r = 1/2, implying positive profits,
and that otherwise profits at the extrema are zero.36 This means that in
simple geographic competition Firms i and j retreat from one another,
resulting in circular sales areas that are tangent at the point (1/2,0), as






36. The second derivative of the profit function with respect to 9 evaluated at 9 = 0 is





The equilibrium condition 0 = 0 can be interpreted as follows. If
Firm i, for example, unilaterally increases (decreases) its production
relative to 0 = 0, its output will clear the market by taking sales away
from (sacrificing sales to) Firmj, according to the corresponding change in
the equi-price frontier, and the quantity choice response of Firmj. Firm]'s
response will be to increase (decrease) its production above (below) 0 = 0,
although by a smaller amount than did Firm i. Countervailing against any
increase in Firm i's profit is the squared effect of market spoilage. Taken
together, Firm i receives a lower profit relative to not having undertaken a
change from 0 = 0. Thus, in light of the competitive and spoilage forces
bearing on its production decision, Firm i prefers 0 = 0 to all other
possible choices.
Note that when 6 > 4/3, 0 = 0 implies that Firms i and j each will
produce as simple, stand-alone, geographic monopolists. However, when
1 < 4/3, which is the range over which geographic competition has
economic meaning, 0 = 0 implies that Firms i andj will each produce less
than they would as geographic monopolists. It is also interesting to note
that for 5 < 2 (2/3), which represents most of the range over which
Firms i andj will compete, the combined output of both firms is less than
that of a single, stand-alone monopolist, and the prevailing mill price is
relatively higher.
In the preceding model, Firms i and j could not inquire as to a
prospective purchaser's location. Rather, each firm simply produced its
output for sale to whomever might want it at the firm's mill price, plus
shipping. Indeed, as shown below, it is precisely because neither firm
could restrict its output from crossing the x = 5/2 line that both firms
were restrained from increasing output, and thereby inducing a rivalrous
response.
VIII. TERRITORIAL COLLUSION IN A GEOGRAPHIC DUOPOLY
This section presents a collusive model in which firms enter into
agreements fixing each firm's exclusive sales territory. Specifically, firms
enter into agreements requiring each firm to decline sales outside its own
(agreed) market territory.
As Figure 2 suggests, in territorial collusion Firms i and j will divide
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the market plane along the vertical line x = 5/2, with each taking half of
the plane as its exclusive marketing territory. Firms i andj will divide the
market plane along x = 5/2 because any other equal-area division requires
Firms i and j to accept relatively unprofitable destinations in lieu of
relatively profitable ones, thus leaving each worse off relative to agreeing
to x = 5/2. When the market plane is divided along x = 5/2, total
profits for both firms together are
{(I P)[P2 (;r _ 0)+Q2)V; 2 (62 ]
With dp c , sin 0 the first order conditions for profit maximization are
dO cos 0
p(3p-2)
We interpret this result as follows.
Note that for p = 2/3, 0 is undefined. This is because when 6 = 0
(both Firms i and j are located at the origin), the joint maximization
problem is the same as the stand-alone monopolist's problem, with each
firm taking half the profit cylinder depicted in Figure 1. That is, when
t = 0, 0 is not defined and p = 2/3.
To interpret the expression for optimal 0 when p 2/3, consider the
general expression for total sales area under collusion
2{p2(r _) +(6 2 ) p2 Y(2 ) 2 }
Substituting the expression for optimal 0 into the general expression
for total sales under collusion reveals the optimal area of collusive sales




which, when positive, implies p > t/2. Thus, relative to geographic
competition (that is, p = o/2), profit maximization under collusion
implies that Firms i and j will: (1) increase output, (2) clear it from the
market at a lower price, and (3) earn a larger profit, as depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5
IX. TACIT COLLUSION AS A NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Figure 2 indicates that the collusive profit maximization problem is
equivalent to the individual firm's profit maximization problem, subject to
the constraint that no sales are made across the vertical boundary x = 3/2.
In other words, relative to the competitive allocation, either firm can
increase its production and profits without threatening its rival's sales, and
without invoking a competitive response, if it restricts its sales from
crossing the 1/2 line. This, of course, would require not only restricting
one's own sales from export, but would also require not selling to
independent resellers. However, if Firm i adopts such policies, it can
increase its production to the collusive level without inducing a rivalrous
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response. Accordingly, it is unilaterally profitable to adopt such a strategy
irrespective of whether one's rival also adopts such a strategy. This result
is summarized as a single-stage game in Figure 6 where V denotes profit,
and c and t denote competitive and territorial strategies, respectively. Note
that Vt>V for both Firms i andj.
As depicted in Figure 6, whether Firmj chooses to adopt a competitive
or territorial strategy, Firm i will choose a territorial strategy. Similarly,
irrespective of Firm i's choice, Firm j will adopt a territorial strategy.




X. CONSUMER SURPLUS IMPLICATIONS
Figure 1 depicts consumer surplus in the case of monopoly as the
volume of the firm's demand cone lying above the profit cylinder. By
inspection, Figure 1 also reveals that consumer surplus increases as sales
increase and price falls. This proposition also holds in the competitive and
collusive models because, as depicted in Figure 2, price and actual sales
generally vary inversely. Thus, a comparison of Figures 4 and 5 reveals
that consumer surplus is greater under collusion than competition, as are
total profits. It follows that total welfare under collusion is greater than
under competition.
vci,vj vti,vj
Wei, vtj vi, vtj
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XI. CONCLUSIONS, ANTITRUST POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND TOPICS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
A. CONCLUSIONS AND ANTITRUST POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The preceding models demonstrate that under reasonable assumptions
both producers and consumers are better off if firms are not prohibited
from colluding explicitly or tacitly to divide geographic markets. That tacit
collusion is a Nash equilibrium suggestive of Adam Smith's invisible hand:
left to their own devices, firms will conduct their affairs in ways that
ultimately benefit consumers. 37  This is not to say that there are no
circumstances under which territorial collusion is harmful to social
welfare.38 However, the models do question whether a per se prohibition
against geographic collusion is justified on efficiency grounds.
The models have implications for merger policy in that a merger
between horizontal competitors is in many respects a license to internalize
collusion. Conventional merger policy demands that a merger between
Firms i and j should draw close scrutiny from the antitrust authorities.39
The models presented here, however, suggest that current antitrust
enforcement practices probably chill efficiency enhancing agreements to
divide geographic markets through horizontal mergers. Therefore, the per
se rule and federal merger policy should be reconsidered.
B. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The models presented here are special cases: simple geographic
monopoly and duopoly. They offer only limited insight regarding markets
comprised of more than two firms. For example, consider a market of three
firms: Firms i, j and k, each located at the vertex of an equilateral triangle.
37. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed. University of Chicago Press 1976) (1904).
38. If the assumptions in the models are changed so that all consumers are located at the
point (5/2,0), the problem degenerates to the standard Cournot model.
39. For a merger between Firms i andj, the pre-merger HHI is 5000, and the post-merger
HHI is 10000, making the increase in HHI due to the merger 5000. Under the Merger
Guidelines, this merger would almost certainly be challenged. Merger Guidelines §1.51
(post-merger HHI above 1800 and an increase in HHI of more than 100 creates a
presumption that a merger will create market power or facilitate its exercise).
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In this case, geographic competition would result in an equilibrium
analogous to the geographically competitive duopoly model because
solving Firm i's competitive dispute with Firmj simultaneously resolves its
dispute with Firm k. (A square market is similar.) When firms are not
equidistant from one another-such as when Firms i, j and k are each
located at a vertex of an isosceles, right or scalene triangle (or four firms
are located at the comers of a non-square rectangle, or trapezoid)-each
firm's competitive sales area will depend primarily on geographic
competition with its nearest neighbor. As depicted in Figure 7, in a
scalene-triangular market the two firms that are closest together will mimic
a geographic duopoly, leaving the third to choose a larger sales area tangent
to its nearest neighbor's sales area (or to choose a monopoly sales area if
that is more profitable).
Obviously, the duopoly models presented above say little about
geographic collusion in Figure 7. It is interesting to note, however, that
although Firms i, j and k all employ the same technology, Firm k has the
largest sales area-it is the market's "dominant firm"-primarily because
of the relative proximity of Firms i and j, and secondarily because of Firm
k's proximity to Firm i. This suggests that market share and so-called
"market power" may be economically unrelated, a proposition which cuts
to the very heart of conventional antitrust merger analysis.40 Thus, Figure 7
and a host of other such examples suggest that geographic competition and
collusion, and their merger counterparts, offer a rich and as yet unexploited










A. GEOMETRY OF THE EQUI-PRICE FRONTIER





Consider a hypothetical consumer located at point D, having distances
hi and hj from Firms i andj respectively. Such a consumer faces delivered
prices of piD(hi) = Pi(p) + hi and PD(h) = Pj(r) + hj. D is on the equi-
price frontier if a consumer located there is indifferent between Firms i and
j. That is, the equi-price frontier is the locus of consumers (points) such
that PD = P . For example, B is on the equi-price frontier because
PiD(p) = pD (r) = 1 by construction.
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Proposition: Referring to Figure 8, and letting f denote the linear
distance of a line segment, D is on the equi-price frontier if and only if
OE-D) = (DF). Proof: From the definitions of PiD , pD above, and the
inverse demand functions zi = (1 - p) and zj =(1-r), it follows
that pD(h)= 1 - £(DF) and pD(h) = 1 - e(DE). Therefore,
PiD(hi) = pD(hj) if and only if e(ED) = f(DF). Q.E.D. The equi-price
frontier is the locus of all such points. In Figure 8, the equi-price frontier
includes points B, D and H.
B. THE EQUI-PRICE FRONTIER As AN IMPLICIT FUNCTION
The equi-price frontier may be written as an implicit function. By the
Pythagorean theorem, (AD)2 = f(AG) + (-D)2 and
£(-) =(-)2 + e(--) 2 . Subtracting the second expression from the
first and rearranging terms yields
o f(- ) 2 2( 2( ) + 2( )
[ONE] A)+ t(G+
Note that (AC) = t(AG) + (GC) = 8. Now, i(D) = 0 - f(D-F)
and (DC) = r - f(DE). Subtracting the second expression from the first,
then noting that e(DF) = (DE), and rearranging terms yields
f(DC) = ( )- (p - r). Squaring both sides yields
[TWO]
Also, £(GC) = 8- (AG), so squaring both sides yields
[THREE] GC +G( ) - 2 (AG).




45 +2 + (-6)2 G 2)2 + 4{3) 2 +(pr)2 _2 )(,r)
which simplifies to become
[FIVE] 2 - 2(-G) = (p -r)- 2 (A)(p-r).
Expression (5) can be rearranged to become
2+ 2(D)(p - r) - (p-r)2
23
Substitution of x = e(AG) and (AD) x + y 2 into (6) reveals the
equi-price frontier as an implicit function:
32 +2(p-2r) x+y z -(p-r)
2
x + 2p p . Q.E.D.
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